The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is an international trade treaty designed to boost member nation’s economic recovery after WWII.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is a multi-national trade treaty. It has been updated in a series of global trade negotiations consisting of nine rounds between 1947 and 1995. Its role in international trade was largely succeeded in 1995 by the World Trade Organization.
The GATT was first conceived in the aftermath of the Allied victory in the Second World War at the 1947 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (UNCTE), at which the International Trade Organization (ITO) was one of the ideas proposed. It was hoped that the ITO would be run alongside the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). More than 50 nations negotiated ITO and organizing its founding charter, but after the withdrawal of the United States these negotiations collapsed.
|Geneva||April 1947||7 months||23||Tariffs||Signing of GATT, 45,000 tariff concessions affecting $10 billion of trade|
|Annecy||April 1949||5 months||34||Tariffs||Countries exchanged some 5,000 tariff concessions|
|Torquay||September 1950||8 months||34||Tariffs||Countries exchanged some 8,700 tariff concessions, cutting the 1948 tariff levels by 25%|
|Geneva II||January 1956||5 months||22||Tariffs, admission of Japan||$2.5 billion in tariff reductions|
|Dillon||September 1960||11 months||45||Tariffs||Tariff concessions worth $4.9 billion of world trade|
|Kennedy||May 1964||37 months||48||Tariffs, anti-dumping||Tariff concessions worth $40 billion of world trade|
|Tokyo||September 1973||74 months||102||Tariffs, non-tariff measures, “framework” agreements||Tariff reductions worth more than $300 billion achieved|
|Uruguay||September 1986||87 months||123||Tariffs, non-tariff measures, rules, services, intellectual property, dispute settlement, textiles, agriculture, creation of WTO, etc.||The round led to the creation of WTO, and extended the range of trade negotiations, leading to major reductions in tariffs (about 40%) and agricultural subsidies, an agreement to allow full access for textiles and clothing from developing countries, and an extension of intellectual property rights.|
|Doha||November 2001||?||159||Tariffs, non-tariff measures, agriculture, labor standards, environment, competition, investment, transparency, patents etc.||The round has not yet concluded. The last agreement to date, the Bali Package, was signed on 7 December 2013.|
Preparatory sessions were held simultaneously at the UNCTE regarding the GATT. After several of these sessions, 23 nations signed the GATT on 30 October 1947 in Geneva, Switzerland. It came into force on 1 January 1948.
Annecy Round: 1949
The second round took place in 1949 in Annecy, France. 13 countries took part in the round. The main focus of the talks was more tariff reductions, around 5,000 in total.
Torquay Round: 1951
The third round occurred in Torquay, England in 1951. Thirty-eight countries took part in the round. 8,700 tariff concessions were made totaling the remaining amount of tariffs to ¾ of the tariffs which were in effect in 1948. The contemporaneous rejection by the U.S. of the Havana Charter signified the establishment of the GATT as a governing world body.
Geneva Round: 1955–56
The fourth round returned to Geneva in 1955 and lasted until May 1956. Twenty-six countries took part in the round. $2.5 billion in tariffs were eliminated or reduced.
Dillon Round: 1960–62
The fifth round occurred once more in Geneva and lasted from 1960 to 1962. The talks were named after U.S. Treasury Secretary and former Under Secretary of State, Douglas Dillon, who first proposed the talks. Twenty-six countries took part in the round. Along with reducing over $4.9 billion in tariffs, it also yielded discussion relating to the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC).
Kennedy Round: 1964–67
The sixth round of GATT multilateral trade negotiations, held from 1964 to 1967. It was named after U.S. President John F. Kennedy in recognition of his support for the reformulation of the United States trade agenda, which resulted in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. This Act gave the President the widest-ever negotiating authority.
As the Dillon Round went through the laborious process of item-by-item tariff negotiations, it became clear, long before the Round ended, that a more comprehensive approach was needed to deal with the emerging challenges resulting from the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and EFTA, as well as Europe’s re-emergence as a significant international trader more generally.
Japan’s high economic growth rate portended the major role it would play later as an exporter, but the focal point of the Kennedy Round always was the United States-EEC relationship. Indeed, there was an influential American view that saw what became the Kennedy Round as the start of a transatlantic partnership that might ultimately lead to a transatlantic economic community.
To an extent, this view was shared in Europe, but the process of European unification created its own stresses under which the Kennedy Round at times became a secondary focus for the EEC. An example of this was the French veto in January 1963, before the round had even started, on membership by the United Kingdom.
Another was the internal crisis of 1965, which ended in the Luxembourg Compromise. Preparations for the new round were immediately overshadowed by the Chicken War, an early sign of the impact variable levies under the Common Agricultural Policy would eventually have. Some participants in the Round had been concerned that the convening of UNCTAD, scheduled for 1964, would result in further complications, but its impact on the actual negotiations was minimal.
In May 1963 Ministers reached agreement on three negotiating objectives for the round:
- Measures for the expansion of trade of developing countries as a means of furthering their economic development,
- Reduction or elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade, and
- Measures for access to markets for agricultural and other primary products.
The working hypothesis for the tariff negotiations was a linear tariff cut of 50% with the smallest number of exceptions. A drawn-out argument developed about the trade effects a uniform linear cut would have on the dispersed rates (low and high tariffs quite far apart) of the United States as compared to the much more concentrated rates of the EEC which also tended to be in the lower held of United States tariff rates.
The EEC accordingly argued for an evening-out or harmonization of peaks and troughs through its cerement, double cart and thirty: ten proposals. Once negotiations had been joined, the lofty working hypothesis was soon undermined. The special-structure countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa), so called because their exports were dominated by raw materials and other primary commodities, negotiated their tariff reductions entirely through the item-by-item method.
In the end, the result was an average 35% reduction in tariffs, except for textiles, chemicals, steel and other sensitive products; plus a 15% to 18% reduction in tariffs for agricultural and food products. In addition, the negotiations on chemicals led to a provisional agreement on the abolition of the American Selling Price (ASP). This was a method of valuing some chemicals used by the noted States for the imposition of import duties which gave domestic manufacturers a much higher level of protection than the tariff schedule indicated.
However, this part of the outcome was disallowed by Congress, and the American Selling Price was not abolished until Congress adopted the results of the Tokyo Round. The results on agriculture overall were poor. The most notable achievement was agreement on a Memorandum of Agreement on Basic Elements for the Negotiation of a World Grants Arrangement, which eventually was rolled into a new International Grains Arrangement.
The EEC claimed that for it the main result of the negotiations on agriculture was that they “greatly helped to define its own common policy”. The developing countries, who played a minor role throughout the negotiations in this round, benefited nonetheless from substantial tariff cuts particularly in non-agricultural items of interest to them.
Their main achievement at the time, however, was seen to be the adoption of Part IV of the GATT, which absolved them from according reciprocity to developed countries in trade negotiations. In the view of many developing countries, this was a direct result of the call at UNCTAD I for a better trade deal for them.
There has been argument ever since whether this symbolic gesture was a victory for them, or whether it ensured their exclusion in the future from meaningful participation in the multilateral trading system. On the other hand, there was no doubt that the extension of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, which later became the Multi-Fiber Arrangement, for three years until 1970 led to the longer-term impairment of export opportunities for developing countries.
Another outcome of the Kennedy Round was the adoption of an Anti-dumping Code, which gave more precise guidance on the implementation of Article VI of the GATT. In particular, it sought to ensure speedy and fair investigations, and it imposed limits on the retrospective application of anti-dumping measures.
Kennedy Round took place from 1962 to 1967. $40 billion in tariffs were eliminated or reduced.
Tokyo Round: 1973–79
Reduced tariffs and established new regulations aimed at controlling the proliferation of non-tariff barriers and voluntary export restrictions. 102 countries took part in the round. Concessions were made on $19 billion worth of trade.
Formation of Quadrilateral Group: 1981
The Quadrilateral Group was formed in 1982 by the European Union, the United States, Japan and Canada, in order to influence the GATT.
Uruguay Round: 1986–94
The Uruguay Round began in 1986. It was the most ambitious round to date, as of 1986, hoping to expand the competence of the GATT to important new areas such as services, capital, intellectual property, textiles, and agriculture. 123 countries took part in the round. The Uruguay Round was also the first set of multilateral trade negotiations in which developing countries had played an active role.
Agriculture was essentially exempted from previous agreements as it was given special status in the areas of import quotas and export subsidies, with only mild caveats. However, by the time of the Uruguay round, many countries considered the exception of agriculture to be sufficiently glaring that they refused to sign a new deal without some movement on agricultural products. These fourteen countries came to be known as the “Cairns Group”, and included mostly small and medium-sized agricultural exporters such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Indonesia, and New Zealand.
The Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round continues to be the most substantial trade liberalization agreement in agricultural products in the history of trade negotiations. The goals of the agreement were to improve market access for agricultural products, reduce domestic support of agriculture in the form of price-distorting subsidies and quotas, eliminate over time export subsidies on agricultural products and to harmonize to the extent possible sanitary and phytosanitary measures between member countries.
ГАТТ «Кеннеди» 1964—1967[править | править код]
Шестой раунд переговоров в рамках ГАТТ, названный в честь президента США Дж. Кеннеди, проходил с мая 1964 по 30 июня 1967 года.
В результате переговоров были сделаны тарифные уступки объемом примерно 40 млрд долларов США, в том числе уступки США по импорту в размере 8,5 млрд долларов и ответные уступки других стран по экспорту в США на ту же сумму.
Среднее снижение тарифов на готовые изделия для четырёх крупнейших участников – США, членов Европейского экономического сообщества (Общий рынок), Великобритании и Японии – составляло примерно 35%. США снижали тарифы в течение пяти лет с 1968 года.
There are several situations in which countries are allowed to violate GATT nondiscrimination principles and previous commitments such as tariff bindings. These represent allowable exceptions that, when implemented according to the guidelines, are GATT sanctioned or GATT legal. The most important exceptions are trade remedies and free trade area allowances.
- Cultural exception
- GATT special and differential treatment
- Most favoured nation
- Культурное исключение
- Особый и дифференцированный режим GATT
- Наиболее благоприятствуемая нация
См. также[править | править код]
- Международное экономическое совещание в Москве
- Aaronson Susan A. Trade and the American Dream: A Social History of Postwar Trade Policy & co (1996)
- Goldstein, Judith (11 May 2017). “Trading in the Twenty-First Century: Is There a Role for the World Trade Organization?”. Annual Review of Political Science. 20 (1): 545–564.
- Irwin, Douglas A. “The GATT in Historical Perspective,” American Economic Review Vol. 85, No. 2, (May, 1995), pp. 323–28 in JSTOR
- McKenzie, Francine. “GATT and the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Summer 2008, 10#3 pp. 78–109
- Zeiler, Thomas W. Free Trade, Free World: The Advent of GATT (1999) excerpt and text search
- Trade Talks Episode 9: Happy 70th GATTiversary—The Origins of Multilateral Trade
- GATT Digital Library 1947–1994 at Stanford University
- The WTO and Global Trade at PBS
- BBCnews World/Europe country profile
- Text of GATT 1947
- Text of GATT 1994